Annually, more than 30 000 Americans are killed on our roads. 2 That is more than 90 deaths per day. (Also, there are more than 3000 injuries per day.) Large though these numbers are, they reflect inadequately the harm from traffic crashes. Unlike victims of diseases, those killed in traffic are overwhelmingly young and, absent their crash, could have looked forward to a life of normal longevity in normal health. The victims include more than 500 children younger than 7 years killed annually, which surely should be more than adequate to terminate any discussion that the victims are all responsible for their fate. Additionally, many die in the womb.
3---5
Three reasons help explain why harm from traffic is not recognized as the massive public health problem it is:
1. The word "accident"
6---9 conveys a sense of inevitability, a belief that crashes are owing to fate and that nothing can be done. Perhaps this is what gives "accident" its most potent appeal-the sense that it exonerates participants and, more importantly, policymakers from responsibility. Although many safety professionals and publications 10, 11 no longer use this term, it is still in wide general use.
Harm in traffic is still not regarded in the
United States as a component of public health to be addressed by public health countermeasures. 12 Traffic safety has all too often been seen as an irritating appendage to transportation. Speed enforcement, a highly effective safety intervention 13, 14 if deployed properly, is often aimed more to raise revenue than to prevent deaths. There is no other aspect of public health that is viewed as a potential source of government revenue rather than a government duty to protect its citizens from being harmed by others.
3. Policymakers are often unaware that traffic safety has been studied as a science for more than 75 years. Insights in the 1938 article in the American Journal of Psychology titled "A theoretical fieldanalysis of automobile driving" 15 are routinely ignored. An edifice of scientific understanding supported by a deep technical literature has blossomed since then. 16---24 Despite this, all too many Americans, from adolescents to the highest ranking policymakers, think they are traffic safety experts because they drive. This is akin to thinking they are pulmonology experts because they breathe.
The launching pad for this research appears in my 2004 book Traffic Safety. 1, 25, 26 I compared US traffic safety policy with that in 3 other countries-Great Britain, 27 Canada, 28 and Australia
29
-which were chosen because they have much in common with the United States in terms of language, culture, beliefs, and traditions, and because suitable data were available. I compared performance over the 23-year period 1979---2002, the latest data available when I performed the earlier research.
I chose 1979 as a reference year because in the late 1970s and early 1980s US traffic safety policies began to diverge from those in other countries. Comparing raw fatalities was 1 of 3 measures I examined. 25 The others were fatalities per registered vehicle and fatalities for the same travel distance. In all cases the results of the comparisons were similar. US performance was so dramatically worse than that of the comparison countries that an additional more than 10 000 deaths per year were occurring on US roads in 2002 or, when summed over the period 1979---2002, an additional 200 000 American deaths. One of the most common questions from Americans to these findings was "What is so special about the comparison countries that they do so enormously better than the United States?" One purpose of the research is to more definitively answer whether it is the United States or the comparison countries that are special.
Questions lingered regarding the earlier study. Perhaps the 3 comparison countries were exceptional at reducing fatalities. Perhaps the comparison countries simply did exceptionally well in the 1979---2002 period, but the United States would experience similar success later as progress in the comparison countries stagnated or faltered.
Objectives. I compared US traffic fatality trends with those in 25 other countries. Methods. I have introduced a new measure for comparing safety in different countries: traffic deaths in a specific year relative to largest annual number recorded. I used only data from the International Road Traffic Accident Database.
Results. 
METHODS
I applied a better analysis method to compare US safety performance through 2011 with performance in 25 countries. My approach differs from that in many previous international comparisons 30---32 in that I have introduced a new measure that uses only fatality data. This keeps the analysis largely assumption-free and also free from uncertainties in computing rates using additional data sets. For example, estimates of distance of travel are unavailable or unreliable for most countries.
The New Measure
The new measure is grounded on a characteristic of the evolution of fatalities in motorized countries. In the early days of motorization few traffic fatalities occurred because there were few vehicles. As motorization increased rapidly, so did the number of traffic deaths. In time the number of deaths declined in response to such factors as improved traffic law and the population maturing with respect to motorized traffic. 21 (12) because of too few data, and Slovakia and Turkey because of too many missing values.
Data for the remaining 26 countries in selected years are presented in Table 1 . Data for all years from the mid-1960s are available as supplemental material to the online version of this article at http://www.ajph.org. I computed all points plotted in the figures from the supplemental material. The main results can be computed from the selection in Table 1 .
The Netherlands' Special Case Data
The Netherlands data shown in Table 1 and the supplementary data (available at http:// www.ajph.org) are in 2 series. From 1996 onward a revised procedure estimated "true" values rather than the long-established police reports that the Ministry of Transport provides. The true estimates augmented the police report totals with cause of death and coroners' records. 37 Some crashes reported as found body or alcohol offense were classified later as traffic crashes. 38 Police underreporting was highest for crashes involving older road users (injuries more severe than the crash scene suggested), crashes in which people died later, singlevehicle crashes, and crashes not involving motor vehicles. The data include fatalities from crashes between bicycles, between bicycles and pedestrians, and single bicycle crashes. 39 US data include only crashes involving motorized vehicles. 2 For all years 1996 through 2012, the true value was at least 6.0% higher than was the police value. Larger discrepancies of 15.0% to 21.0% occurred in recent years, possibly reflecting reduced effort on the part of police to follow up on injuries because they knew others were doing this. The true value was, on average, 7.4% higher than was the police value. Accordingly, the data in Table 1 for years before 1966 are the police-reported data increased by 7.4%. This is the approach IRTAD uses. 13 The results from the Equation 1 analysis were not materially different if I used the original police-reported data or if I used percentages other than 7.4 (including zero) to correct the pre-1996 fatalities.
I did not revise the data for any other country in a similar way. Table 1 ). Taken in isolation this might look like impressive progress. Indeed, US officials hailed it as showing that their policies were highly successful. However, when the US 16% reduction is compared with the average reduction of 49% computed from Table 1 for the 3 comparison countries, an entirely different conclusion is unavoidable. Figure 1a provides no evidence that after 2002 the large difference between the United States and the comparison countries was cancelled. On the contrary, the United States barely kept parallel with Canada and Australia but fell even further behind Great Britain. Table 1 ). Figure 2a shows the United States and the 3 comparison countries compared with a number of other countries that achieved larger reductions than did the 3 comparison countries. Japan, Sweden, and other countries are not plotted because their data largely overlap with those of Great Britain, the original comparison country that attained the largest fatality reductions.
Clearly, the original 3 comparison countries were not uniquely successful. If I had chosen other countries, the measured difference between them and the United States would have been even larger. Driver fatalities per 1000 registered vehicles are presented in Figure 3a . All governments collect the number of registered vehicles to tax vehicles; this number is available in IRTAD data. 11 In the 1970s the number of US deaths per 1000 registered vehicles was lower than was the number for each of the other 25 countries. US traffic was often heralded at the time as the safest in the world. 41 By 2011 the United States had dropped from number 1 in safety to number 19 (out of 26). The 18 countries that had fewer deaths per 1000 vehicles than did the United States by 2011 were Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Each of these countries had higher rates in 1970. Because rates in other countries are continuing to decline faster than is the US rate, it seems likely that the United States will fall to lower ranking than its present number 19.
Traffic fatalities per billion kilometers of vehicle travel are presented in Figure 3b . The distance traveled by all vehicles in a nation can be determined only if a measurement program is established and provided ongoing support. The most reliable data are from Great Britain, which has a long-time commitment to estimating total travel in Great Britain. Britain currently obtains estimates based mainly on around 10 000 manual counts, by which trained enumerators count traffic by vehicle type over a 12-hour period. 42 Estimates of total travel in the United States are on the basis of estimates from the individual states. There is no published information on how states make such estimates. The US rate in 1970 was 29.64 deaths per billion kilometers of travel. By 2011 it dropped to 6.83 per billion kilometers (or 1.10 deaths per 100 000 000 miles 19 ). This is a 77.0% decline. From 1970 to 2011 the rate for Great Britain declined from 34.89 to 3.30 deaths per billion kilometers, an 88.9% decline. Note that the Great Britain rate was substantially higher than was the US rate in 1970 but substantially lower in 2011. If the US rate had declined by the same 88.9% as that of Great Britain, the US rate would have dropped to 3.02 deaths per billion kilometers, and US fatalities would have been 15 661 instead of the 32 367 observed. The Equation 1 estimate for Great Britain from the data in Table 1 conclusions, now supported with enormously more data, are even more firmly established. All the fatality rates examined declined in the United States over the past 4 decades. However, they declined more rapidly in each of the other 25 countries, in most cases far more rapidly. In terms of declines after reaching a maximum number of fatalities, the United States is a unique outlier. All 25 other countries declined further and faster.
Years Since Reaching Maximum
The differences found are of such enormous magnitude as to be largely unaffected by explanations in terms of confounding factors, which in any event are mainly rendered moot by the Equation 1 measure and additionally by the other measures in Figure 3 .
The United States was the safest country in the world in the 1970s. By 2011 the United States dropped from number 1 to number 19 in terms of traffic fatalities per registered vehicle and to number 13 (out of 19 countries providing data) in terms of traffic fatalities for the same travel distance.
The failure of the United States in traffic safety is of near incomprehensible magnitude. By simply matching the road safety changes in a number of other unremarkable countries, the United States could prevent 20 000 traffic deaths per year.
US safety policy continues to be a public health catastrophe. If the United States could only match the far from perfect safety performance of a number of other countries, 20 000 fewer Americans would be killed annually and almost a million injuries prevented. An explanation of why this happens is given in an editorial 43 in this issue.
As a US citizen and member of the US National Academy of Engineering, it pains me to come to these conclusions. However, the data speak for themselves, and the conclusions are inescapable. They apply only to road safety; the United States is the world leader in other safety areas, such as air travel. j
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